Abstract. In this paper, we propose an identities(ID) based watermarking scheme for Java programs. In our scheme, the watermark is generated by participants' identities, embedded via the watermarked opaque predicates, and verified using zero-knowledge proof. We also present a construction of a family of opaque predicates by Legendre symbol, which is resilient, cheap, and stealthy. The order of the watermark is encoded and embedded into the watermarked opaque predicates, and the watermarked opaque predicates are treated as threads of a Java program. Thus, the embedded watermark is dynamic and secure against all usual types of watermarks algorithms attacks and watermarks protocols attacks, and also secure against static and dynamic attacks.
Introduction
As the international network is becoming faster and more widespread, there has been an increased need for digital rights management, especially the protection of intellectual property rights over softwares becomes a paramount issue. Watermarking schemes which had been developed to assert authorship or ownership control over digital works such as images, video or audio, are being extended to cover software objects. However, most software watermarking schemes fail because it is easy to tamper or delete software watermarks, keeping the overall semantics of the program constant.
A software watermark should fulfill the following criteria:
1. The watermark should be robust, i.e., it should be resistant to watermarks algorithms attacks, such as software transforms which preserve the meaning of the program. 2. The watermark should be invisible, i.e., it should only be detectable by using special forensic software.
Here we give a brief overview of previous work done in the field of software watermarking. The first formal software watermarking approach was described in paper [1] , in which a watermark is embedded into a program by rearranging the order in which basic blocks of the program were arranged. A method of encoding the watermark inside a dummy method in the form of opcodes is described in paper [2] , but using simply applying semantics-preserving transforms can easily damage or remove watermarks in paper [1, 2] without changing the semantics of the programs. Paper [3] firstly described a dynamical watermarks scheme, in which the watermark is constructed in the form of a graph dynamically during the program execution, the scheme is against static-time analysis, but it is not very difficult to be recognized which parts of the software belong to the original codes and which belong to the dynamic watermark generating code. In paper [4] , a final dynamic experimental watermarking method relies on multi-threading to encode watermarks, and all encoded watermarks are in the choice of execution of basic blocks depending on the input pattern of the program, but for every encoded watermarks bit, the size of the software increases by nearly 1 KB, so this is a low capacity scheme.
Opaque predicates were first presented in paper [8] as a technique to aid in code obfuscation. Later opaque predicates were incorporated in Java programs watermarking technique proposed in paper [10] . Informally, the inserted opaque predicates make it difficult for an adversary to analyze the control-flow of the programs. This makes it more difficult to identify what certain portions of the programs are superfluous, but the opaque predicate library must remain secret, if an adversary knows even a few of the predicates he may be able to identify and remove them from the programs. Regrettably, the method [10] hasn't considered cryptographically secure, so it shouldn't stand against copy attacks and ambiguity attacks [5] .
In this paper, we propose an identities (ID i ) of participants based watermarking scheme. In our scheme, the identities (ID i ) and a Java program J are signed using extended aggregate signatures scheme, then the concatenation of signatures is regarded as the watermark information ω, thus our watermarking scheme can stand against copy attacks, passive ambiguity attacks, and others of watermarked protocols attacks. We also construct a family of watermarked opaque predicates {O j } j=n j=1 using Legendre symbol, and the bits of ω and some appended information are encoded inside these predicates. Our watermarked opaque predicates have better resilience to resist static and dynamic attacks. Because the watermarked opaque predicates are treated as threads of J , they are difficult to be distinguished from original codes. Additionally, our watermarking scheme has a lower data bloating.
The remainder of our paper are structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basic of knowledge, including construction of a family of watermarked opaque predicates and watermark determining. Section 3 introduces our watermarking scheme, including encoding watermark algorithms, embedding watermark algorithms and detecting watermark algorithms. Section 4 analyzes the security of our watermarking scheme for Java programs. Finally, conclusions are presented in section 5.
The Basic of Knowledge

Notations
Denote by J a Java program, which is available for manipulation in the current state, denote by ω the watermark information which is encoded and embedded into the program J, and denote by K embedding watermark key. Let E be a watermark embedding function, i.e. E : (J, ω, K) → J ω , and let D be a watermark detecting function, i.e. D:
For i ∈ (1, 2, ..., m), let ID i be the identity of the i-th participant, let s i be the signature of
Constructing Opaque Predicates
According to the interleaving semantics, n statements in a parallel programs can be executed in n! different ways, so they are more difficult to analyze statically than their sequential counterparts. It is well-known that parallel regions are constructed by threads in Java, Java's threads have two very useful properties to be used for obfuscation: one is that their scheduling policy is not specified strictly by the language specification, hence it will depend on the implementation, another is that the actual scheduling of a thread will depend on asynchronous events generated by user interaction, network traffic, etc., so we will use these observations combining with watermarking technique to create highly resilient watermarked opaque predicates. Constructing a family of Watermarked Opaque Predicates. To resist the attacks, the number of opaque predicates O j must be large enough. One way of making O j larger is using parametrized predicates(see paper [10] ). This paper utilizes Legendre symbol [11] to construct a family of watermarked opaque predicates {O j } j=n j=1 . Let Legendre symbol of module a prime p be (
, and the corresponding family of watermarked opaque predicates is:
In eq. (1), if the bit of encoded watermark information is 1, we choose b to be satisfied with ( 
3. Let p = 8x + 5, compute ( d p ), and the corresponding family of watermarked opaque predicates is:
j=n j=1 is parametrized by a given prime p above. This parameter can be generated by picking random values of x ∈ Z, t ∈ Z, and then testing if the resulting p is prime. The value of the variable d and b should be determinable at run-time only. Individual predicate should be hard to be resolved.
The watermarked opaque predicates {O j } j=n j=1 are secret.
Determining the Watermark
In this paper, a Java program J and identities (ID i ) are signed by participants using extended aggregate signatures scheme in turn, then the concatenation of signatures is regarded as the watermark information ω. The participants include all programmers, copyright holder, and purchasers, etc. Aggregate signature is firstly proposed in paper [6] , paper [7] presented an extended aggregate signature. Our extended aggregate signature schemes is as approximately same as paper [7] except our bilinear mapping e being the mapping from elliptical cyclic G 1 to finite field G 2 .
System Parameters. Suppose that a trusted central authority(CA) is responsible for generating the system parameters, as follows:
-Choose G 1 as a elliptic curve additive group of prime order q, P ∈ G 1 as a generator of G 1 , and G 2 as a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. 
Extended Aggregate Signature Schemes S. For i ∈ (1, 2, ..., m) , a Java program J is signed by every participants ID i , the order of signatures is passed from ID i to ID i+1 , the signature method is extended aggregate signature scheme, as follow
, and recursive functions s i be:
The signature of ID i on the Java program J is < s i , L i >. 3 Watermarking Scheme P J Select g ∈ Z randomly, and decompose the program J into (g+1) branching segments with points {o f } f =g f =1 , these segments are {J 0 , J 1 , J 2 , ..., J g }. Use the embedding watermark key K to insert ω into J by the embedding watermark functionE .
The secret parameters are K, the order of ω, the watermarked opaque predicates {O j } j=n j=1 , the opaque predicates's key k j , and each participant's private key x i , and the public parameters are each participant's public key y i .
Encoding Watermark Algorithms
1. Choose a number of dual data randomly, such as, (a 1x , b 1y ) , ..., (a lx , b ly ) ∈ Z q . 2. Append these dual data behind ω:
3. Choose an invertible encode permutation σ, and rearrange ω in a bits sequence by permutation σ :
4. Encode the bits of ω σ in "core" of our opaque predicates {O j } 
Remark 1.
Let the number of bits encodable with our predicates O j be N (O j ), in any case, the bits length of ω σ is satisfied with
(see paper [10] ).
Embedding Watermark Algorithms
For j ∈ (1, 2, . .., n), f ∈ (1, 2, ..., g ), c ∈ (1, 2, ..., h) For j ∈ (1, 2, ..., n), c ∈ (1, 2, ..., h) 
4. Verify:
is true, verifier accepts J ω as legal; otherwise, accepts J ω as illegal.
Security
Theorem 1. Our watermarking scheme P J is secure against passive ambiguity attacks and copy attacks.
Proof. The DHP in G 1 is hard, so our extended aggregate signatures scheme S is secure against existential forgery on messages or sequence of identities. This assertion is shown in Theorem 1 of [7] and in Theorem 4.5 of [13] . Let the length of J be n, and y i be the public key of ID i . Named an adversary Alice. We treat passive ambiguity attacks and copy attacks separately. are designed in such a way that several predicates have to be cracked at the same time. Thus they stand against dynamic attacks. It is shown in paper [3, 8] .
According to Corollary 2 again, our watermarking scheme P J is more secure against statical and dynamic attacks. Proof. It is obvious from Eq.(10). In Our watermarking scheme P J , the verifying of the watermark ω uses zero-knowledge proof [6, 12] , which is a non-interactive proof involving many provers and one verifier. Proof. It's evident. Whereas, most of former watermarking schemes hadn't considered authentication.
Conclusions
The construction of our watermarked opaque predicates is based on Legendre symbol, and the data structure of Legendre symbol is simple, so the data bloating is lower in our scheme than other schemes previously.
From Theorem 4 and Corollary 3, we can choose the order of the watermark ω according to the priority of the participants, the lowest prior participant signs at first and the highest prior participant signs at last.
Our watermarking scheme is dynamic and secure against all usual types of attacks, it is clear that our scheme might can be applied equally well to other languages programs.
